Why mutual helping in most natural systems is neither conflict-free nor based on maximal conflict by Bshary, Redouan et al.
For Review Only
 1
Why mutual helping in most natural systems is neither conflict-free nor based on 1 
maximal conflict 2 
Redouan Bshary*, Klaus Zuberbühler* & Carel van Schaik# 3 
 4 
* Institute of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Emile-Argand 11, 2000 Neuchâtel, 5 
Switzerland 6 
# Anthropological Institute and Museum, University of Zürich, Winterthurerstrasse 7 
190, 8057 Zürich, Switzerland 8 
 9 
Corresponding author: Redouan Bshary 10 
 11 
Short title: Solving intermediate conflict levels 12 
 13 
 14 
Keywords: cooperation, mutualism, by-product mutualism, prisoner’s dilemma, 15 
pseudoreciprocity, biological market 16 
 17 
  18 
Page 1 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 2
Abstract: Mutual helping for direct benefits can be explained by various game 19 
theoretical models, which differ mainly in terms of the underlying conflict of interest 20 
between two partners. Conflict is minimal if helping is self-serving and the partner 21 
benefits as a by-product. In contrast, conflict is maximal if partners are in a prisoner’s 22 
dilemma with both having the payoff-dominant option of not returning the other’s 23 
investment. Here, we provide evolutionary and ecological arguments for why these 24 
two extremes are often unstable under natural conditions and propose that interactions 25 
with intermediate levels of conflict are frequent evolutionary endpoints. We argue 26 
that by-product helping is prone to becoming an asymmetric investment game since 27 
even small variation in by-product benefits will lead to the evolution of partner 28 
choice, leading to investments and partner monitoring. Second, iterated prisoner’s 29 
dilemmas tend to take place in stable social groups where the fitness of partners is 30 
interdependent, to the effect that a certain level of helping is self-serving. In sum, 31 
intermediate levels of mutual helping are expected in nature, while efficient partner 32 
control mechanisms may allow reaching higher levels. 33 
34 
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Introduction 35 
Helping, defined as an act that increases the direct fitness of a recipient, has attracted 36 
great interest as it is at odds with general Darwinian notions of competition and self-37 
interest. One solution has been Hamilton’s (1964a,b) kin selection theory of altruism 38 
where helping is directed at genetically related individuals. However, nature is full of 39 
examples where helpers and recipients are unrelated, most obviously in interspecific 40 
interactions, “…the basis of the world as we know it” (Bronstein 1994). Within the 41 
same species, there are also countless examples of individuals helping unrelated 42 
conspecifics, provided it yields overall direct fitness benefits. Given the great 43 
confusion regarding terminology, the best we can do is to define each term when 44 
using it for the first time. We follow Bshary & Bergmüller (2008) who put together 45 
existing definitions in a coherent way. Based on Lehmann & Keller (2006) and 46 
Bronstein (2001), mutual helping for direct fitness has been termed ‘cooperation’ if it 47 
occurs between members of the same species and ‘mutualism’ if it occurs between 48 
members of different species (see also Bronstein 2015). 49 
 50 
Key topics in research on helping are to determine how population structure and life 51 
history lead to unconditional helping and to identify the decision rules and partner 52 
control mechanisms of conditional helping (Lehmann & Keller 2006). Partner control 53 
occurs if a co-operator takes an action that lowers the pay-off of a defector, for 54 
instance by defecting, punishing, or sanctioning the defector with premature 55 
termination and refusal to interact again, or by switching to a new partner (Bshary & 56 
Bergmüller 2008).  57 
 58 
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There is considerable confusion in the current literature regarding terminology for 59 
mutual helping for direct fitness. A key distinction for is between members of the 60 
same species, which has been termed ‘cooperation’, and between members of 61 
different species, which has been termed ‘mutualism’ (Lehmann & Keller 2006; 62 
Bronstein 2001; 2015). In the following, we define each term separately, following 63 
(Bshary & Bergmüller’s 2008) systematic review. 64 
 65 
Although stable mutual helping can be explained by numerous models, the literature 66 
is dominated by two scenarios. Either helping is inherently self-serving, with no 67 
danger of defection, or it is an ‘investment’ (a payoff reduction irrespective of a 68 
partner’s action) that is compensated by future benefits, which creates a temptation to 69 
defect. We will first present both scenarios in detail before arguing that, in most 70 
biological systems, the assumptions upon which they are based are ecologically 71 
implausible. We will further argue that, in the real world, most cases of dyadic mutual 72 
helping are accompanied by some level of conflict, which in turn has selected for 73 
partner monitoring and control, both between related and unrelated individuals. We 74 
will present stylised games that capture what may well be the most common stable 75 
endpoint - intermediate levels of conflict - and propose ways in which these games 76 
could be explored in the future. 77 
 78 
Helping with minimal levels of conflict 79 
Arguably, the most straightforward condition for stable mutual helping is a situation 80 
in which each individual performs a self-serving act that benefits a partner as a by-81 
product. We call this ‘by-product helping’ as it may occur within and between 82 
species. Brown (1983) has referred to the same condition as ‘by-product mutualism’, 83 
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but this term clashes with the original use of the term ‘mutualism’, i.e. cooperation 84 
between species (see Bronstein 2015)). A good example for ‘by-product helping’ is 85 
the ‘selfish herd’ effect (Hamilton 1971). For example, seals reduce inter-individual 86 
distances when swimming through zones with great white sharks, which is both self-87 
serving for the actor and beneficial for the partner, as it reduces the predation risk for 88 
both (De Vos & O’Riain 2010). Another example is cooperative hunting, provided the 89 
hunting success increases with group size (Lamprecht 1978, Boesch & Boesch 1989). 90 
Cooperative hunting can also occur between species, as recently described in 91 
interspecies interactions between groupers (a predatory fish) and other predatory 92 
species (Bshary et al. 2006, Vail et al 2014). In these cases, the hunters position 93 
themselves to maximize their own hunting success and immediately swallow any 94 
captured prey, with no sharing (Bshary et al. 2006). Thus, the benefits accrue due to 95 
self-serving coordination in time and space rather than through mutual investments. 96 
 97 
A second form of stable helping without defection is positive pseudo-reciprocity 98 
(Connor 1986). Positive pseudo-reciprocity involves an initial investment that enables 99 
the recipient to perform a self-serving act that in turn benefits the investor as a by-100 
product. A prime example is the tri-trophic interaction between plants, insect 101 
herbivores and parasitoid wasps (Turlings et al. 1990). When attacked by a herbivore, 102 
the plant produces volatiles, which enables the wasp to detect the herbivore. The wasp 103 
will then self-servingly lay her eggs into the herbivore, which will kill it and benefit 104 
the plant a by-product. Pseudo-reciprocity can also be mutual. For example, in 105 
lichens, a composite organism of algae living in the filaments of a fungus, the fungus 106 
invests by producing a shelter that enhances the efficiency of the algae’s 107 
photosynthesis and nutrient production, which enables the fungus to grow more 108 
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rapidly and produce more shelter. As the fungus transfers the algae vertically to the 109 
next generation of fungi, the fitness of both partners is interdependent, which prevents 110 
defection from either side. 111 
 112 
Due to the inherent stability of by-product helping and positive pseudo-reciprocity, 113 
various authors have hypothesized that they should be abundant in nature (Clutton-114 
Brock 2009, Leimar & Hammerstein 2010, Bshary & Bronstein 2011). While many 115 
well-documented examples are mutualisms, i.e. interactions between species, there 116 
are also examples of cooperation, i.e. intraspecific interactions, such as the selfish 117 
herd effect (Hamilton 1971). 118 
 119 
Helping with maximal levels of conflict 120 
We define helping with maximal levels of conflict of interest as cases in which all 121 
individuals would do best by fully defecting each other (i.e., in the absence of a 122 
partner control) as the evolutionarily stable strategy. The exploitation aspect 123 
distinguishes our concepts of interest from potentially stable lack of cooperation in 124 
coordination games, in which non-coordinators do not exploit coordinators. In 125 
interactions with maximal conflict, helping behaviour can only emerge if partners are 126 
able to provide mutually conditional investments. We use the term ‘mutually 127 
conditional investment’ as equivalent to Trivers’ (1974) ‘reciprocal altruism’, a term 128 
we avoid as it clashes with Hamilton’s (1964) definition of ‘altruism’. i.e. helping 129 
relatives due to kin selection. We avoid the term ‘reciprocity’ as a shortcut for 130 
reciprocal altruism as is the term is currently used in many different ways. The 131 
standard model for direct mutually conditional investments is the iterated prisoner’s 132 
dilemma, a game in which two players repeatedly choose between cooperating and 133 
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defecting. The payoffs are such that mutual cooperating yields higher payoffs than 134 
mutual defection, but in each single interaction defection maximises immediate 135 
payoffs independently of the partner’s action (Fig. 1). Thus, to cooperate is an 136 
investment, where future return benefits can only be due to the partner providing 137 
return investments. Due to the payoff structure, however, the temptation to defect is 138 
continuously present.  139 
 140 
Despite a perpetual temptation to defect, a variety of partner control mechanisms can 141 
nevertheless lead to stable mutual investments. In fact, economists have shown that 142 
solutions with almost any frequency of investments are possible, provided mutual 143 
helping creates a surplus in payoffs and a sufficient number of rounds are played 144 
without a fixed known final round (‘folk theorem’: Binmore 2005). Largely unaware 145 
of the economic literature, evolutionarily minded scientists spent have expended 146 
considerable effort to identifying successful strategies that start cooperatively and 147 
continue to cooperate as long as the partner also cooperates (reviewed by Dugatkin 148 
1997). In the most famous strategy in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, tit-for-tat, 149 
one individual cooperates on the first iteration of the game and then does exactly what 150 
the partner has done on the previous move, i.e., defect on a defector or cooperate with 151 
a co-operator (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). An alternative solution to achieve 152 
mutually conditional investments in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma type game is 153 
‘negative reciprocal investment’ where a cooperative individual pays a cost to reduce 154 
the payoff of a defecting partner (‘punishment’; Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995). 155 
Another particularly powerful partner control mechanism is to threaten with partner 156 
switching, which promotes mutual investments, at least in well-mixed populations 157 
(Izquierdo et al. 2010). 158 
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 159 
Various biologists have argued that, in contrast to by-product benefits and pseudo-160 
reciprocity, direct mutually reciprocal investment is rarely found in non-human 161 
species, both in between- and within-species interactions (Bergstrom et al. 2003, 162 
Hammerstein 2003, Stevens & Hauser 2004, Leimar & Hammerstein 2010, Raihani & 163 
Bshary 2011, Raihani et al 2012), which is at odds with the theoretical literature. 164 
There are a few convincing examples for mutually conditional investments, i.e. 165 
experimental studies that demonstrate contingent helping: rats in a laboratory food 166 
pulling task (Rutte & Taborsky 2008), flycatcher mobbing behaviour (Krams et al 167 
2008), food provisioning in vampire bats (Carter & Wilkinson 2013 in combination 168 
with Wilkinson 1984), apparent support for grooming in baboons (Cheney et al. 2010) 169 
or tolerance and support for grooming in vervet monkeys (Borgeaud & Bshary 2015). 170 
Despite these examples, there is still a general perception that there is a discrepancy 171 
between the considerable efforts to find mutually reciprocal investments and the 172 
empirical results.  173 
 174 
The discrepancy between theoretical efforts and empirical evidence is understandable 175 
but also surprising. It is understandable because theoreticians are not interested in 176 
modelling conflict-free helping as the stability of helping in such cases is self-evident 177 
and theoretically uninteresting, whereas the opposite is the case for helping resolving 178 
maximal conflicts. What is currently debated, however, is why empiricists struggle to 179 
find convincing examples of helping that involve mutually conditional investments 180 
and what ‘rare evidence’ might actually mean. We therefore quickly summarise and 181 
comment on some proposed explanations or opinions. 182 
 183 
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One argument for why evidence for mutually conditional investments is rare is that 184 
such helping can only evolve if two mutations arise simultaneously in at least two 185 
individuals that are potential partners of each other: to invest and the ability to invest 186 
conditionally on the partner’s return investment (André 2014). Such an admittedly 187 
evolutionarily unlikely scenario has become known as the bootstrapping problem 188 
(André 2014; see also André 2015 for some potential solutions). Alternatively, several 189 
authors have pointed out that mutually conditional investments might be rare because 190 
non-human species lack the necessary cognitive abilities to keep track of the outcome 191 
of past social interactions, especially if this involves interactions with several partners 192 
(Hammerstein 2003, Stevens & Hauser 2004).  193 
 194 
While we acknowledge that evolvability and cognitive constraints may prevent the 195 
evolution of mutually conditional investments, in many cases we do not think that 196 
these explanations suffice to explain the apparent rarity of mutually conditional 197 
investments in nature. The evolvability argument seems to be based on assumptions 198 
concerning gene-behaviour relations that do not apply to species with brains. 199 
Vertebrates and invertebrates have been shown to lear  appropriate behaviour via 200 
classic and operant conditioning (Shettleworth 2010). In the latter, animals condition 201 
their own behaviour as a function of the changes in the environment. It does not really 202 
matter whether the environment is abiotic or an interaction partner and whether in the 203 
latter case the situation is potentially cooperative or competitive. There are countless 204 
examples in the optimal foraging literature showing that many species are capable of 205 
efficiently fine-tuning their responses to payoff differences when moving between 206 
food patches (Davies et al. 2012), and Kacelnik (2012) makes a strong case that such 207 
foraging decisions can be most parsimoniously explained with the all-purpose tool 208 
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‘operant conditioning’ rather than situation specific evolved rules-of-209 
thumbs/heuristics. A similar point has been made by Bshary & Oliveira (2015) who 210 
argued that selection on brain functioning works mainly on higher functional circuits 211 
involved in decision-making in a variety of different social situations. To our mind, 212 
the same line of argument can be applied to explain situation-specific conditional 213 
helping. All we need to explain is the evolution of learning rules (like strength of 214 
reinforcement, weighing of past interactions, exploration of behavioural repertoire) 215 
that allow individuals to adjust their behaviour during their lifetime. Dridi & 216 
Lehmann (2014, 2015) give wonderful examples how exploratory trial-and-error 217 
reinforcement learning rules evolve that allow individuals to solve an iterated 218 
prisoner’s dilemma.  219 
 220 
The argument made above puts the emphasis on the cognitive constraint hypothesis. 221 
As we see it, this hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the fact that individual 222 
recognition is widespread in at least in various vertebrate clades like mammals, birds 223 
and fishes (Griffiths & Ward 2011; Shettleworth 2010), and has even been shown in 224 
social insects (Tibbets 2002). Lack of mobility allows ‘i dividual recognition’ based 225 
on location, as is the case for ants interacting with their many partner species or for 226 
pollinators interacting with flowering plants. Moreover, memory capacities are 227 
apparently sufficient for learning through operant conditioning, with the evolution of 228 
crucial learning rule parameters subject to natural selection (Dridi & Lehmann 2014, 229 
2015). Indeed, it has repeatedly been argued that solving an iterated prisoner’s 230 
dilemma game might not be as rare is often assumed because scientists were looking 231 
for strategies proposed by theoreticians, like tit-for-tat, while animals make decisions 232 
differently. For example, it has been argued that decisions about mutually conditional 233 
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investments may be based on a more general assessment of recent social interactions 234 
(‘attitudinal reciprocity’, de Waal 2000), on the general quality of a relationship 235 
(‘emotional reciprocity’, Schino & Aureli 2009), or on general past experience rather 236 
than precise counting with each potential partner (‘generalized reciprocity’, Pfeiffer et 237 
al. 2004) (see also Cheney 2011). All these proposed decision mechanisms could be 238 
based on the dynamics of learning through operant conditioning (or on higher 239 
cognitive processes if available). Two field experiments on baboons and on vervet 240 
monkeys fit the idea of attitudinal or emotional mutually conditional investments 241 
(Cheney et al. 2009, Borgeaud & Bshary 2015). Crucially, having recently groomed 242 
another individual increases the probability of receiving his or her tolerance or 243 
coalitionary support. This implies that the return investments are not ‘all-or-nothing’; 244 
in fact, although effects that are conditional on recent grooming are present both in 245 
related/bonded pairs and in unrelated/non-bonded pairs, they come on top of different 246 
baseline levels for interactions without prior grooming. Various other experiments 247 
(with both positive and negative results; Seyfarth & Cheney 1984; Hemelrijk 1994; de 248 
Waal 1997, 2000; de Waal & Berger 2000; Koyama et al. 2006; Melis et al. 2008; 249 
Brosnan et al. 2009; Brosnan & Beran 2009; Dufour et al. 2009; Pele et al. 2009; 250 
Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009, 2010; Horner et al. 2011; Tiddi et al. 2011; Campenni et 251 
al. 2015; Molesti & Majolo 2015) and a large number of correlational studies (Schino 252 
2007) provide additional evidence for such graded mutually conditional investments 253 
in primates. Based on this extensive experimental and correlational evidence, we 254 
predict that graded mutually conditional investments are indeed common in primates 255 
and will be found also in other taxa.  256 
 257 
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This statement applies not only to positive contingencies but also to negative ones, i.e. 258 
punishment, where current correlational and experimental evidence is even rarer in 259 
non-human animals (Raihani et al. 2012). While cognitive constraints may limit the 260 
usefulness of punishment in various situations (Brosnan et al. 2010, Raihani et al 261 
2012), the fact that aggressive responses to cheating can cause more cooperative 262 
behaviour in fish in both inter and intra-specific interactions (Bshary & Grutter 2005; 263 
Bshary & Bshary 2010; Raihani et al 2010) suggests that at least many vertebrate 264 
species should have the cognitive requirements to use punishment. 265 
 266 
This leads us to the issue of whether the phenomenon of strictly mutually conditional 267 
investments solving an iterated prisoner’s dilemma is truly rare, as we argued above. 268 
To us it is a matter of perspective: if the game structure of every single case of 269 
helping for direct benefits was known and total sums are made, we would expect 270 
numerous cases of mutually conditional investments solving an iterated prisoner’s 271 
dilemma payoff matrix (i.e. in the 1000s, to put a rather preliminary estimate). To 272 
place this in perspective, helping for direct benefits is ubiquitous, as shown by the 273 
myriad of cases of pollination mutualism, plant-microbe interactions in the soil or 274 
mutualisms involving ants protecting partner species. A group of mutualism 275 
specialists proposed in 2003 that none of these cases is suspected to solve an iterated 276 
prisoner’s dilemma (Bergstrom et al. 2003), a view that has hardly changed since 277 
(Bronstein 2015). We hope that these illustrations put our use of the term ‘rare’ into 278 
perspective. Mutually conditional investments are so rare that we think that additional 279 
arguments have to be explored in addition to (not instead of) arguments about 280 
genetic/cognitive constraints.  281 
 282 
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The ecology of helping for direct benefits  283 
Here, we follow up on the possibility that prisoner’s dilemma-type payoff structures 284 
are rarely found in nature due to ecological reasons (Bshary & Bronstein 2011). We 285 
do so not in mathematical terms but by developing socio-ecologically relevant 286 
scenarios. As all three of us are empiricists, we apologize for the realistic possibility 287 
that as the number of references to the theoretical literature is relatively low, we might 288 
miss out on relevant models that would have made our points already in a more 289 
elegant (i.e. mathematical) way. Also, while we think that models that allow for 290 
continuous investments are biologically more realistic, we illustrate our points with 291 
stylised games with discrete behavioural options. We do so because we think that the 292 
logic is easier to grasp and because we are interested in different classes of models, 293 
i.e. models that predict no conflict, intermediate conflict and maximal conflict (Fig. 294 
1). This classification holds for both continuous and discrete behavioural options (see 295 
Doebeli et al 2004 or Bshary et al. 2008 for continuous options in snowdrift and 296 
prisoner’s dilemma games). Before we challenge the ecological validity of prisoner’s 297 
dilemma-type payoff matrices, we will challenge the notion that conflict-free 298 
cooperation/mutualism is a stable endpoint of mutual helping in nature. Both 299 
scenarios (starting out with by-product benefits or with prisoner’s dilemma payoff 300 
structure) have in common that the resulting levels of conflict are intermediate, i.e. 301 
cooperative behaviour would persist to some extent even in the absence of partner 302 
control mechanisms. Furthermore, both scenarios have in common that selection leads 303 
to changes in individual strategy spaces, which in turn leads to changes in game 304 
structure and corresponding payoff matrix.  305 
 306 
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A specific example is provided by Friedman & Hammerstein (1991) in their analysis 307 
of egg trading in the simultaneously hermaphroditic hamlet fish (see Akçay & 308 
Roughgarden 2011; Steward & Plotkin 2014 for other models). Hamlets form pairs in 309 
the late afternoon. Partners alternate several times between releasing eggs and 310 
fertilising eggs (Fischer 1988). This seems to be rather inefficient compared to each 311 
partner releasing all eggs in one bout. However, such a release pattern would be 312 
vulnerable to cheaters: as eggs are more costly to produce the individual that releases 313 
its eggs first would face the risk that the partner fertilises the eggs and then leaves to 314 
find a new partner that still has eggs. Releasing all eggs in one bout would correspond 315 
to a sequential one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, where defection is the only stable 316 
outcome. The evolution of a parcelling strategy, combined with waiting till late 317 
afternoon, overcomes the problem of defection. Parcels are so small that the best 318 
response to receiving a parcel for fertilisation is to give a parcel, to which the best 319 
response is to provide the next parcel, until all eggs are fertilised. This is because the 320 
benefits of staying are larger than the benefits of leaving: leaving involves search 321 
costs and the risk of not finding another partner in the little time before sunset 322 
(Friedman & Hammerstein 1991). Thus, the evolution of a parcelling strategy has 323 
transformed the payoff matrix for each decision from a prisoner’s dilemma game to a 324 
pseudoreciprocity game (Friedman & Hammerstein 1991). 325 
 326 
Why most cases of helping are likely to involve intermediate levels of conflict 327 
a) Shifts from chance by-product benefits to coordination to conditional 328 
helping in an asymmetric game 329 
As discussed earlier, by-product mutualism and positive pseudoreciprocity are based 330 
on the notion that helping is free of conflict, which provides ideal starting points for 331 
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the evolution of helping, as often argued for mutualisms (Bergstrom et al. 2003, 332 
Barbu et al. 2011). However, we argue that this game structure is often not stable. 333 
Where by-product benefits occur, there would inevitably be selection on increased 334 
association rates that cause coordination costs as well as selection on partner choice 335 
(cf. Noë et al. 1991; Noë & Hammerstein 1995). We illustrate these points with an 336 
example of collaborative hunting between groupers and partner species, such as 337 
moray eels. While the benefits are entirely due to by-products of self-serving 338 
behaviour, the magnitude of these benefits is likely to vary between individuals. 339 
Empirically, it has been described that the willingness to participate in cooperative 340 
hunting is variable in both partners (Bshary et al. 2006). Furthermore, there seems to 341 
be individual variation in the ability to coordinate movements, perseverance, and the 342 
frequency with which prey is flushed towards the partner. Such variation can be due 343 
to ontogenetic effects, with evidence for individuals changing their behaviour 344 
drastically between subsequent years (Redouan Bshary, unpublished data). In 345 
addition, it seems likely that partners of different sizes have different prey preferences 346 
and differential effects on prey escape behaviours. As a result, individuals have the 347 
choice between more or less suitable (profitable) partners, and laboratory experiments 348 
have demonstrated that groupers readily do choose better collaborators (Vail et al. 349 
2014), something demonstrated first in chimpanzees (Melis et al 2006).  350 
 351 
The key point here is that these interspecific hunting associations form a biological 352 
market with individuals having the choice between different partners, sometimes 353 
belonging to different species, e.g. groupers may choose from moray eels, Napoleon 354 
wrasses and octopuses (Vail et al. 2014). As soon as there is exchange of goods or 355 
services, the market forces of supply and demand are expected to start operating (Noë 356 
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et al. 1991, Noë & Hammerstein 1995). In particular, groupers should preferentially 357 
associate with partner species or individuals that provide the best by-product benefits 358 
and partners should prefer groupers that provide the best by-product benefits for them 359 
in turn. As the hunting associations are mutually beneficial, being involved in more of 360 
them means increased foraging success, which should translate into an increased 361 
fitness. Therefore, individuals are under selection to choose good partners and to be 362 
chosen frequently. Competition within a class of traders over access to partners is 363 
predicted to lead to outbidding (Noë et al. 1991). In the cooperative hunting example, 364 
there is some observational evidence for outbidding at the partner recruitment stage. 365 
First, it seems clear that groupers preferentially seek moray eels rather than Napoleon 366 
wrasses to initiate a joint hunt in order to search for suitable prey (Bshary et al. 2006): 367 
groupers associate above chance levels with moray eels but not with Napoleon 368 
wrasse. The preference breaks down in areas where there are few partners available 369 
(Vail et al. submitted). In contrast, in areas where partners are more abundant than at 370 
the initial study site (Bshary et al. 2006), groupers alter their behaviour in an 371 
important aspect: they rarely initiate joint hunting but instead join moray eels that 372 
already started to move through the reef (Vail et al. submitted). Thus, the coordination 373 
costs to start a hunting association are paid flexibly by different partner species 374 
depending on partner availability. Arguably, most by-product mutualisms are likely to 375 
involve such coordination costs. For example, mixed species associations in primates 376 
yield by-product benefits due to the reduction in predation risk but the coordination 377 
requires deviation from optimal foraging routes. The presence of this trade-off 378 
explains why associations do not occur 100% of the time (Noë & Bshary 1997).  379 
 380 
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The conflict is well illustrated with the battle-of-the-sexes game in which two players 381 
want to be together but differ in their spatial preferences, which create a conflict about 382 
who is paying the cost for being together. Biological market theory can make 383 
predictions about which class of traders is winning the battle and which one is losing 384 
it (Noë & Hammerstein 1995). In the absence of markets, differences in needs may 385 
result in ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ (Lamprecht 1996; Harcourt et al. 2009; see 386 
Bergstron & Lachmann 2003 for an evolutionary scenario for mutualisms) and, it is 387 
also possible that individuals alternate in paying the coordination cost. Note that this 388 
would lead to an alternating helping pattern without involving an iterated prisoner’s 389 
dilemma payoff matrix.  390 
 391 
In the grouper example, there is currently only evidence for shifts in which a partner 392 
pays the coordination costs. However, it is easy to imagine that the biological market 393 
would select newly arising strategies that go beyond the provisioning of by-product 394 
benefits. For example, while successful individuals immediately stopped the 395 
collaboration in all observed cases of successful hunts, an individual that would 396 
continue the collaboration under such conditions might well benefit from such 397 
investments if this increases the chance that partners more readily accept invitations 398 
by this individual and/or choose this individual with increased probability.  399 
 400 
In sum, we propose that any interaction that starts out as by-product benefits or as 401 
pseudoreciprocity has the potential to evolve into a system that involves specific 402 
investments with the sole purpose to be chosen as a partner, as soon as the system 403 
involves a biological market. Under such circumstances, stable investments can be 404 
achieved through the threat of partner switching, a form of negative pseudoreciprocity 405 
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(Bshary & Bergmüller 2008): individuals invest because it would otherwise be in the 406 
self-interest of the partner to stop the interaction and switch to a different individual. 407 
In conclusion, any form of by-product benefit may lead to partner choice whenever 408 
partners differ in the magnitude of by-product benefits they provide. This in turn leads 409 
to competition through outbidding and the evolution of investments, which are 410 
monitored and insured through the threat of partner switching.  411 
 412 
Fig 2 summarises the important steps from chance meetings to an asymmetric game in 413 
a biological market. The amount of extra investment will be a function of the relative 414 
abundance of the two classes of partners (Johnstone & Bshary 2008). If conditional 415 
choices by the choosing class have a minor cost (denoted ε in Fig. 2), negative 416 
frequency dependent selection leads to the coexistence of bidding individuals 417 
(‘cooperators’) and non-bidding individuals (‘defectors’) and partner switching as the 418 
partner control mechanism employed by members of the choosing class. This scenario 419 
corresponds in various important features to arguments put forward recently by André 420 
(2015), who argued that the initial presence of helping may facilitate the evolution of 421 
conditionals strategies as such a scenario resolves the bootstrapping problem. 422 
 423 
b) Shifts from maximal mutual levels of conflict to intermediate mutual levels of 424 
conflict 425 
An assumption of the standard iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is that current 426 
interaction partners have an independent past and an independent future once the 427 
game is over. As a consequence the fitness of individuals is independent of the one of 428 
their partner, apart from the link that is created through the payoff consequences of 429 
their decisions during interactions. However, these assumptions are frequently not 430 
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met in nature, especially in animals that are most likely to have iterated interactions: 431 
animals that live in stable social groups characterised by kinship, long-term 432 
relationships, and social bonds. Under such conditions, the fitness of the social 433 
animals can be strongly determined by interdependencies. The best-known and most-434 
studied interdependency is based on genetic relatedness and the resulting biological 435 
altruism (kin selection, Hamilton 1964ab). Interestingly, however, long-term social 436 
bonds between genetically unrelated individuals or even just being a member of the 437 
same group are likely to have similar effects (Kokko et al. 1999; Eshel & Shaked 438 
2001; Roberts 2005). As Roberts (2005) proposed, the logic of ‘r’ in Hamilton’s rule 439 
can in principle be applied to any form of interdependence and denoted the coefficient 440 
‘s’ for stake. Note though the functioning is quite different: the value of r is fixed for 441 
related individuals, while a coefficient of interdependence between genetically 442 
unrelated individuals can change with time and directly affects the values of b and c. 443 
As an example of interdependence between unrelated individuals, in a slave-making 444 
ant species, several unrelated queens team up and rapidly produce a sufficient number 445 
of workers that can defend the common nest. For individual queens, there is no 446 
temptation to cheat because any failure to contribute will automatically lead to the 447 
failure of all queens (Bernasconi & Strassmann 1999). Once enough workers exist, 448 
the interdependence between queens drops below a critical threshold and the queens 449 
fight each other to the death until a single victor remains (Bernasconi & Strassmann 450 
1999). The principle of interdependence applies more generally to social animals as 451 
any helping that generates benefits from repeated interactions over a long time period 452 
is likely to cause interdependence between partners. The higher the interdependence, 453 
the more often social situations become such that it is a self-serving strategy to 454 
support partners when they need it. Long-term partners become social assets that need 455 
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to be cherished and are costly to loose: helping is under positive selection as long as 456 
the benefits for the recipient times the degree of interdependency outweighs the cost 457 
of helping (Roberts 2005). Remember that this rule does not predict that individuals 458 
always help, but that helping is contingent on the act yielding net benefits 459 
independently of any reciprocal investment. Hence, we do not necessarily expect the 460 
strict contingency postulated by the model of mutually conditional investments. 461 
 462 
So what cases of helping between unrelated individuals may involve important levels 463 
of interdependency? We propose that, as a general rule, interdependency is correlated 464 
with the stability of partner availability. Stable relationships are most likely to occur 465 
in stable groups. For example, in bi-parental bird species with life-long monogamy, 466 
the death of the partner causes a decrease in the fitness of the surviving individual 467 
(Black et al. 1996; Ens et al. 1996). Similar effects seem also to be present in primates 468 
(Engh et al 2006). In many primates, individuals of one sex (typically females) remain 469 
all their life within their natal group (Wrangham 1980). Evidence is accumulating that 470 
under such circumstances, a stable core social network has a positive effect on 471 
individual fitness (Silk et al 2009, 2010).  472 
 473 
Interdependence is by no means restricted to group living species. Mutualisms in the 474 
form of symbioses provide many good additional examples. Here, genetic 475 
interdependence is absent but interdependence might still be strong if partners live 476 
intimately together over extended time periods; it is maximal in case of joint vertical 477 
transmission to the next generation. Well known cases of such symbioses include gut 478 
bacteria, lichens, corals and some ant mutualisms (Bronstein 1994, 2001). For such 479 
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cases, it has been argued that interests are rather aligned and conflicts small 480 
(Bronstein 1994, 2001, Leimar & Hammerstein 2010). 481 
 482 
Interdependency versus mutually conditional investments based on an iterated 483 
prisoner’s dilemma 484 
Despite the various critical reviews and the well-established role of mutual 485 
dependency on helping, there is a considerable literature that seeks to explain helping 486 
behaviour as forms of mutually conditional investments within an iterated prisoner’s 487 
dilemma framework, often based on observational data. Various recent highly 488 
interesting studies on alternated helping with respect to vigilance in rabbitfish pairs 489 
(Hughes & Bellwood 2015), coordinated hunting in lionfish (Lönnstedt et al 2014) 490 
and leading during migration flights in geese (Voelkl et al. 2015) yield great examples 491 
for coordination but not for mutually conditional investments solving an iterated 492 
prisoner’s dilemma, at least not until it is demonstrated that investments are 493 
contingent and a prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix is the most parsimonious 494 
assumption. We argue that the latter is the more challenging part because of the 495 
frequent occurrence of genetic and social interdependencies. We illustrate this 496 
concern in Fig. 3, in which we show how interdependencies can transform a payoff 497 
matrix that looks like a prisoner’s dilemma into other games once the effects of 498 
interdependency are included (see Dugatkin 1997 ; Peña et al 2015 for theoretical 499 
papers).  500 
 501 
The best-known among the games emerging from interdependencies is the snowdrift 502 
game, which is also called the hawk-dove game (when emphasising the competitive 503 
rather than cooperative nature of an interaction; Maynard-Smith 1982). In this game, 504 
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an individual’s best option depends on what the partner is doing. If the partner 505 
cooperates the best option is to defect, if the partner defects the best option is to 506 
cooperate. This is because mutual defection yields the lowest payoff for both players. 507 
As a consequence, the success of cooperating and defecting displays negative 508 
frequency dependence (Maynard-Smith & Price 1973). One possible solution is to 509 
cooperate and to defect with probabilities that generate stable frequency dependence 510 
(Maynard-Smith & Price 1973). However, this will lead to cases in which both 511 
partners defect and hence both lose out, and hence various mechanisms may lead to 512 
the emergence of co-operators and defectors (Doebeli et al. 2004, Dridi & Lehmann 513 
2014). An even better solution would be that the two partners cooperate. How 514 
partners would achieve this solution is not obvious, however, as an individual that 515 
knows that the partner always defects should always cooperate to maximize its own 516 
payoff. Mutually conditional helping that is contingent on the partner’s behaviour 517 
would provide a solution. The option to switch partners in a biological market might 518 
offer an alternative control mechanism to achieve high levels of mutual help as co-519 
operators could leave defectors. As the baseline level of helping is not zero like in a 520 
prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix but b/c, resulting high levels of helping would be 521 
partially self-serving and partially mutually conditional investments (Fig. 4).  522 
 523 
 524 
 525 
General discussion 526 
Our general goal has been to understand the evolution of dyadic cooperation and 527 
mutualism. The theoretical literature is heavily biased towards the iterated prisoner’s 528 
dilemma game, but there is little evidence for this game in natural systems. A 529 
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currently popular alternative explanation is pseudo-reciprocity (Clutton-Brock 2009, 530 
Leimar & Hammerstein 2010), a situation in which partners have come to rely on 531 
each other with a stake in other’s success, and so both benefit from helping. While 532 
pseudoreciprocity is thus rather conflict-free, we have made verbal arguments why 533 
ecology and evolution may often alter individual strategy space such that asymmetric 534 
games emerge in which conflicts of interest between partners are of intermediate level 535 
rather than minimal or maximal. Conversely, we argued for games of maximal 536 
conflict, i.e. in the form of iterated prisoner’s dilemmas, that ecology and evolution 537 
may often drive individual strategy space such that interdependency leads to games 538 
with intermediate conflict levels, as exemplified by the snowdrift game.  539 
 540 
The take home message is that some level of conflict is bound to be widespread in 541 
both cooperation and mutualism. On the other hand, maximal conflict based on a 542 
prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix is most likely rare. Even the primate examples 543 
presented earlier that provided convincing evidence for mutually conditional 544 
investments between non-bonded group members (Cheney et al 2010; Borgeaud & 545 
Bshary 2015) might still be built on top of a low level of unconditional helping due to 546 
interdependence (group augmentation, Kokko et al. 1999). The temptation to fully 547 
defect is most likely to be found in some mutualisms characterised by short 548 
interactions where the fitness of a behavioural phenotype of an individual is hardly 549 
affected by the partner’s survival. However, we do not know of cases based on mutual 550 
temptation to defect as assumed by the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Instead, 551 
mutualisms often represent games with asymmetric strategic options. Marine cleaning 552 
mutualisms involving cleaner wrasses of the genus Labroides provide a case in point. 553 
These cleaners have inherent preference for the clients’ mucus over their 554 
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ectoparasites, so that feeding on the latter can be interpreted as an investment (Grutter 555 
& Bshary 2003). More importantly, cleaners that follow their inherent preferences 556 
(i.e. cheat by feeding on mucus) may slightly reduce client survival but will otherwise 557 
not suffer any further repercussions, mainly because they interact with many different 558 
clients (Côté 2000 and typically live shorter than them (data available on 559 
fishbase.org). In contrast, the vast majority of client species has no means to defect on 560 
a cleaner, i.e. to perform a behaviour that increases own payoff at the expense of a 561 
cooperating cleaner. Possibly because the conflict does not involve interdependencies, 562 
the system has yielded experimental evidence for a variety of partner control 563 
mechanisms, including punishment, partner switching and social prestige (Bshary & 564 
Grutter 2005, Pinto et al. 2011). Asymmetric cheating options are highly abundant in 565 
mutualisms, with experimental evidence that contingent helping may occur even in 566 
plants and insects (Pellmyr & Huth 1994; Kiers et al. 2003; Brandenburg et al. 2012). 567 
For within-species cooperation, evidence for pay-to-stay in cooperatively breeding 568 
systems (Bergüller & Taborsky 2005) provides a class of examples if one classifies 569 
reduced conflict as cooperation: Hamilton & Taborsky (2005) made the point that in 570 
the absence of additional incentives pay-to-stay only leads to minimal exploitation of 571 
breeders by helpers. 572 
 573 
In conclusion, we see great scope for both theoreticians and empiricists to consider 574 
games with intermediate levels of conflict, and to explore how selection on changes in 575 
individual strategy spaces lead to changes in game structure and payoff matrices. 576 
Mutual or alternating, conditional helping does not in itself provide evidence for an 577 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma, as the same patterns may emerge in an iterated snowdrift 578 
game or an iterated battle-of-the-sexes game. Furthermore, as we have suggested 579 
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repeatedly in this paper, the market conditions in each study system have to be 580 
understood and incorporated. While free markets favour both conflict and the easy 581 
solution of partner switching, more restricted markets reduce conflict but potentially 582 
offer no solution to the remaining conflict level.  583 
 584 
Finally, it will be interesting to investigate in how far the payoff structure is linked to 585 
various features of social interactions in stable groups; i.e. features that have been 586 
traditionally introduced by primatologists to the study of animal behaviour: gradual 587 
build-up of relationships (bonds; Silk 2003), reconciliation and other repair or 588 
servicing mechanisms (Aureli & Waal 2000), including negotiation (van de Waal et 589 
al. 2013) or inequity aversion (Brosnan & de Waal 2003). Linked to this issue, one 590 
can ask questions about the cognition underlying these features. Stake-based 591 
cooperation is predominantly described in long-lived animals with long-term social 592 
bonds, individual recognition, and good memory capacities (Seyfarth & Cheney 593 
2012) but stakes exist also in other systems. The monitoring of partner behaviour 594 
within a broader social context and corresponding high degrees of freedom with 595 
respect to own behavior may well make social relationships cognitively demanding 596 
and hence a key aspect of the Social brain hypothesis (Dunbar & Schultz 2007). Of 597 
overarching importance is that we understand the ecology of our study species. 598 
Differences in life-history, social systems, genetic relatedness and cognitive abilities 599 
are likely to have a major influence on levels of helping and underlying decision 600 
rules. Only if we know the diversity of social interactions and helping patterns 601 
observable in our study species in nature can we conduct meaningful field or lab 602 
experiments. 603 
 604 
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Figure legends 883 
Fig. 1: relative payoff matrices for 4 different stylised games. In each game two 884 
players have the choice of either invest (cooperate) or defect. The payoffs in the 885 
matrix are those for player 1. As the prisoner’s dilemma is typically illustrated with 886 
the numbers 3,0,5,1 we kept these numbers for the other games. Note that in the 887 
battle-of-the-sexes game, mutual investment would mean that each player goes to 888 
where the partner would prefer to go, meaning that each one ends up alone at the own 889 
less preferred place, which leads to the lowest possible payoff. 890 
 891 
Fig. 2: Changes of payoffs as a consequence of selection leading to changes of 892 
individual strategies. Payoffs in each matrix are ranked relative to each other and not 893 
comparable between payoff matrices. The first payoff matrix represents a game prior 894 
to evolution, where players meet by chance and increase their payoffs as a 895 
consequence of by-product benefits. Due to resulting selection on increased 896 
associations, coordination costs arise that could be shared paid by one partner. 897 
Asymmetric partner choice options will to members of the chosen class trying to 898 
outbid each other by evolving extra investments for the sole benefit of partners in 899 
order to be chosen. If conditional choices by the choosing class has a minor cost ε, 900 
negative frequency dependent selection leads to the coexistence of bidding 901 
individuals (‘cooperators’) and non-bidding individuals (‘defectors’). As members of 902 
the chosen class need to pay the coordination costs in any case, they invariably gain 903 
less than members of the choosing class. 904 
 905 
Fig. 3: Examples how payoff matrices that fulfil the criteria for a prisoner’s dilemma 906 
(T>R>P>S and 2R>T+S) transform into qualitatively different payoff matrices if 907 
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there is either genetic relatedness or social interdependency between partners. In all 908 
cases, Hamilton’s relatedness coefficient r= the interdependency coefficient s = 0.5. 909 
The first payoff matrix transforms to a snowdrift game, the second to a game in which 910 
investing is dominant over defecting, and the third into a game we are not aware it has 911 
a name. Crucially, all the resulting payoff matrices do not feature always defect as an 912 
ESS but instead intermediate or full levels of cooperation. 913 
 914 
Fig. 4: On the left: ESS ‘default’ levels of cooperating in different games: 100% for 915 
by-product benefits and positive pseudoreciprocity, b/c for a snowdrift game and 0% 916 
for a prisoner’s dilemma game. For the latter games, iterated interactions may allow 917 
the evolution of full cooperation based on mutually conditional investments. Given 918 
that snowdrift games yield intermediate levels of cooperating by default, the 919 
challenge for researchers will be to identify the additional partially reciprocal 920 
investments on top of those intermediate levels. 921 
Page 39 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
invest 
player 1 
defect 
Prisoner’s dilemma                              By-product helping 
option1 
player 1 
option2 
       player 2 
option1   option2 
R=
3 
4       3 2        2 
1        1 3        4 
       player 2 
invest      defect   
R=
3 
3       3 1        4 
4        1 2        2 
Battle-of-the-sexes                                 Snowdrift game 
       player 2 
 help       no help 
R=
3 
4       4 2        3 
3        2 1        1 
help 
player 1 
no help 
       player 2 
 help       no help 
R=
3 
3        3 2        4 
4        2 1        1 
help 
player 1 
no help 
Fig.1 
Page 40 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
invest 
player 1 
defect 
       player 2 
invest     defect  
R=
3 
R = 3 S = 0 
T = 5 P = 1 
       player 2 
invest     defect  
R=
3 
R = 4.5 S = 2.5 
T = 5 P = 1.5 
Prisoner’s dilemma  matrices                       resulting matrices 
       player 2 
invest     defect  
R=
3 
R = 3 S = 0 
T = 4 P = 1 
       player 2 
invest     defect  
R=
3 
R = 4.5 S = 2.5 
T = 4 P = 1.5 
Snowdrift game 
invest 
player 1 
defect 
‘Prisoner’s delight’ 
       player 2 
invest     defect  
R=
3 
R = 2 S = 0 
T = 3 P = 1 
invest 
player 1 
defect 
       player 2 
invest     defect  
R=
3 
R = 3 S = 1.5 
T = 3 P = 1.5 
?equal opportunities? 
R = 0.5 
I = 0.5 
R = 0.5 
I = 0.5 
R = 0.5 
I = 0.5 
Fig.3 
Page 41 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
  By-product benefits 
  Positive pseudoreciprocity 
 
 
  Snowdrift game 
 
 
 
 
 
  Prisoner’s dilemma 
 
ESS levels of 
cooperating 
100 
 b/c 
   0 
reciprocal 
investment 
‘partially’       
reciprocal 
investment 
Fig.4 
Page 42 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Market forces 
Outbidding  
Selection on 
coordination 
       player 2 
together    alone  
R=
3 
2       2 
1       1 
       player 2 
coord.   no coord.   
R=
3 
3       3 2        4 
4        2 1        1 
Fig. 2: Shifts from chance by-product benefits to  coordination to conditional helping in an asymmetric game  
together 
player 1 
alone 
coord. 
player 1 
 no coord. 
       chooser 
accept  conditional   
R=
3 
1        4 1      4-ε 
2        3 
bidding 
chosen 
 no bidding No 
interact 
Page 43 of 43
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
